

HORACE A.P. 128–30: THE INTENT OF THE WORDING*

difficile est proprie communia dicere, tuque
rectius Iliacum carmen deducis in actus
quam si proferres ignota indictaque primus.

C.O. Brink's discussion of these lines takes five pages in the body of his commentary, and is continued in an appendix of nine pages at the end.¹ But the passage has for so long caused such sore vexation that his treatment of it seems actually compendious rather than long, and deserves our gratitude. With the main part of his solution, which is to understand *communia* as 'generalities to which individual features must be given' (p. 196), I fully agree. To be sure this interpretation was also the interpretation of Orelli, Kiessling-Heinze, Rostagni, and other distinguished predecessors. Brink's contribution is to have expounded more fully than anyone before him why it must be so. The purpose of this article is to throw doubt upon a further thesis about Aristotelian influence which Brink has superimposed upon his interpretation, and then to discuss a couple of points not yet raised, so far as I know, which may yet help to elucidate Horace's intent.

I. THE LATINITY OF *COMMUNIA* / *PROPRIE*

After considering and rejecting other interpretations of the antithesis *communia* / *proprie*, Brink concludes that the two words are terms borrowed from logic ('universal' versus 'particular'), and immediately connects them with Aristotle's use of the terms καθόλου and καθ' ἑκάστων in chapter 9 of the *Poetics*.² 'Aristotle's *Poetics* ch. 9 . . . remains the background to H.'s pronouncement' (p. 206). In the commentary it is not entirely clear whether Brink envisions a direct allusion to the Aristotelian passage, or merely an influence transmuted in the course of its descent through the writings of Hellenistic critics.³ But it is improbable that the passage of the *Poetics* is involved in either way. Horace uses different terms, makes a different point, and incidentally appears to contradict the *Poetics*: divergences which would leave room only for an allusion of the most cryptic kind.

In the first place, Horace's terminology corresponds, not to Aristotle's contrast of καθόλου and καθ' ἑκάστων, but to the post-Aristotelian terms κοινόν and ἴδιον.⁴

* I am grateful for advice and reproof to Professors H.C. Gotoff, E.J. Kenney, and Otto Skutsch, and especially to Robert Renchan, whose comments have guided revision in at least a dozen places.

¹ C.O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry: The 'Ars Poetica'* (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 204–8 and 432–44.

² 'This leaves us with the words as terms in logic, introduced by Aristotle into literary theory and, I believe, employed by H. in this passage. Aristotle's reason for so introducing this term into *Poet.* ch. 9 was in fact a logical and perhaps polemic one.'

Brink, *The 'Ars Poetica'*, p. 205.

³ Probably the latter, however: at least this is the explicit view presented in the volume which preceded the commentary on the *Ars*, *Horace on Poetry: Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles* (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 105–6.

⁴ That Horace's terminology corresponds not to Aristotelian but post-Aristotelian usage is in effect conceded by Brink, *The 'Ars Poetica'*, p. 206: '. . . the Greek wording behind the Latin *communia* and *proprie* was κοινόν (not καθόλου) and ἴδιος (not καθ' ἑκάστων). These words . . . were used

Despite this, Horace may yet have wished to recall the passage of the *Poetics*, but if he did, he must have relied on something other than the mere choice of words *communia* / *proprie* to suggest it. Is the context of the *A.P.*, then, similar enough to the context of the *Poetics* for us to discern in Horace a paraphrase of Aristotle's ideas? Aristotle contrasts poetry with history: poetry deals with universals, in the sense that it shows 'how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act according to the law of probability or necessity' (Butcher's translation), while history deals with particulars, in the sense of actual events—'for example, what Alcibiades did or suffered'. Horace is speaking only of the activity of a poet, which he describes as a reconciling of the universal and the particular: 'it is hard to lend individual features to general concepts' (Brink, *Prolegomena*, p. 106). Both writers invoke the antithesis between universal and particular, and both invoke it in connection with poetry. But they apply it in different ways—not in opposite ways (which might support the notion that Horace had Aristotle in mind), but in contexts which seem simply unrelated.⁵ And finally, if one were to press the two texts at the one point where they can be made to express an opinion about the same thing, they would seem to disagree. Aristotle asserts that poetry deals with universals. Horace on the other hand implies that the successful poet must anchor his work in the particular.⁶

In the face of these differences, Horace's dependence on chapter 9 of the *Poetics* can be vindicated only if there remain similarities which must derive from Aristotle and from no other source. There are two similarities. As to the first, probably no one would insist that, after three centuries of philosophical disputation, it was a peculiarly Aristotelian convention for Horace to talk in terms of universals and particulars. And even if it were, the influence could hardly be ascribed to a specific passage of the *Poetics*. The second similarity is that both Aristotle and Horace introduce into a discussion of poetic activity a notion borrowed from logic. This coincidence is especially impressive to a modern reader, who does not ordinarily trust logic to interpret the artistic imagination. The expectation of an ancient reader, however, was different. Between Aristotle and Horace lay a tradition of rhetorical theory which on the one hand was heavily indebted to Aristotle⁷ and to subsequent philosophers⁸

by Aristotle as well, and at any rate *κοινόν* is put by him beside *καθόλου* as a convertible term . . . As early as the first generation after Aristotle the pairs are interchangeable, not only *κοινόν* associated with *καθόλου* but *ἴδιον* associated with *καθ' ἑκάστων*.

⁵ The lack of correspondence between the two passages is more intricately argued by G. Williams in his review of Brink's *Prolegomena*, *JRS* 54 (1964), 189. But perhaps Brink himself can best be quoted in witness of the un-Aristotelian quality of Horace (*Prolegomena*, pp. 105–6): 'A glance at the section beginning at *Ars* 119 shows that the Aristotelian theory did not prove viable without a severe reduction. . . . There is no evidence that in this, technical, portion of the poem the more *recherché* features of Aristotle's thought are preserved. The content of poetry as a whole is no longer identified with universals, *καθόλου*, and poetic universality is not set over against

non-poetic particularity, *καθ' ἑκάστων*. There is here no counterpart to the first sentence of Aristotle's chapter which lays down that it is the poet's job to say what might happen, and what is possible according to probability or necessity, not what did happen. Nor are the logical categories of probability or necessity attached to the concept of the universal.'

⁶ Here, once again, Brink acknowledges the discrepancy (*The 'Ars Poetica'*, p. 207): 'Like Aristotle [Horace] can talk in terms of "general" and "particular". But he is not a philosopher and is aware of the particularity of the poetic process. So, unlike Aristotle, he knows . . . that to put universals in a particular manner is hard.'

⁷ Cf. Kroll's article 'Rhetorik' in *RE* Suppl. vii (1940), 1065.

⁸ Cf. Kroll (above, n.7), 1080–3. Kroll cites Quintilian's statement (3.1.15): 'Theophrastus quoque, Aristotelis discipulus,

for its systematization and terminology, and which in turn supplied many of the tools and biases of what we would now call literary criticism.⁹ There can be no doubt that rhetorical writers had used the handy distinction of universal and particular. Aristotle himself applies it in several ways in his *Rhetoric*.¹⁰ More pertinent to the Horatian passage is the doctrine of the *κοινὸς τόπος*, or, as it is better known, the *locus communis*.¹¹ The word ‘common’ in this phrase was not in its original intention equivalent to ‘trite’, ‘widely used’, or ‘commonplace’. It distinguished a plane of argument on which the orator, transcending the circumstances of a particular case, dealt with more general or universal issues. That the term rests on a distinction between ‘general’ and ‘particular’ can be shown by quoting a couple of passages which treat of the *locus communis*. First, Nicolaus, *Progymnasmata, peri koinou topou* (J. Felten, *Rhetores Graeci* xi (Leipzig, 1913), p. 36):

Κοινὸς δὲ τόπος ἐστὶν αὐξήσις καὶ καταδρομὴ ὁμολογουμένου ἀδικήματος· (ἄλλοι δ’ οὕτως ὀρίζονται· κοινὸς τόπος ἐστὶν αὐξήσις ὁμολογουμένου ἀδικήματος) ἢ ἀνδραγαθήματος.

Πρῶτον οὖν λεκτέον, διὰ τί κοινὸς λέγεται τόπος. κοινὸς μὲν οὖν, ὅτι οὐ κατὰ ὥρισμένον προσώπου ἐστίν, οἷον κατὰ Τιμάρχου πόρνον ἢ κατὰ Λυκόφρονος μοιχοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς κατὰ πόρνον ἢ μοιχοῦ.¹²

The second illustration may suitably be taken from a Latin source, Cicero, *De oratore* 3.106: ‘illi loci . . . quamquam proprii causarum et inhaerentes in earum nervis esse debent, tamen quia de universa re tractari solent, communes a veteribus nominati sunt.’¹³

I have been trying to demonstrate that the concept of ‘general’ versus ‘particular’ was too well established in technical writing, among rhetoricians as well as philosophers, for us to imagine that we hear in Horace’s *communia* / *proprie* the echo of any specific predecessor, much less of any particular passage. Let me now shift the focus of argument, and assert that Horace’s words must be fully intelligible against a background of Latin usage alone. It is not credible that this

de rhetorice diligenter scripsit, atque hinc vel studiosius philosophi quam rhetores praecipue Stoicorum ac Peripateticorum principes.’

⁹ See C. S. Baldwin, *Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic* (New York, 1924), pp. 224 ff., esp. pp. 242–6 on Horace; and W. Rhys Roberts, *Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism* (New York, 1920) p. 149.

¹⁰ e.g. at 1.2.15 (1367^b1–3), 1.2.21–2 (1358^a10–20), 1.13.2 (1373^b4–6), 2.20.1 (1393^a23–5), 3.5.3 (1407^a31–2). One would expect a strong parallelism between dialectic and rhetoric to be articulated in a work which begins with the sentence ἡ ρητορικὴ ἐστὶν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ.

¹¹ The term *κοινὸς τόπος* is not actually found in Greek rhetorical treatises until well after the appearance of its Latin cognate in Roman treatises. But the Greek writings in which it does appear (Nicolaus, *Progymnasmata, peri koinou topou* (J. Felten, *Rhetores Graeci* xi (Leipzig, 1913), 36); Hermogenes, *Progymnasmata* 29 (H. Rabe, *Rhet. Gr. vi* (Leipzig, 1913), 11–12); Anonymous, *Techne*

Rhetorike 169–70 (C. Hammer, *Rhet. Gr. i* (Leipzig, 1894), 382); Aphthonius, *Progymnasmata* (L. Spengel, *Rhet. Gr. ii* (Leipzig, 1854), 32); Joannes Sardonius, *Commentarii in Aphthonii Progymnasmata* (H. Rabe, *Rhet. Gr. xv* (Leipzig, 1928), 90) are of conservative character and largely derivative. Moreover, a closely related rhetorical theory was propounded by a writer who can be dated to the second century B.C. Hermagoras of Temnos introduced into his system of rhetoric a distinction between particular and general themes (*θέσεις* and *ὑποθέσεις*), which was also borrowed from logic. For the (shifting) relationship between the *locus communis* and the *θέσεις*, see H. Throm, *Die Thesis: Ein Beitrag zu ihrer Entstehung und Geschichte* (Paderborn, 1932), pp. 118–28. Cf. also Cicero, *Orator* 46–7.

¹² Cf. also the texts cited above in n.11, especially the passage from the Anonymous.

¹³ A briefer but similarly worded passage is *Orator* 126; a fuller exposition is given at *De inventione* 2.48.

purist can have written something which his Roman readers had first to convert into Greek before they could understand him. *Communia* / *proprie* must make good sense in Latin, or it is not good Latin. And conversely, if it is ordinary Latin, it cannot very well be Aristotelian.

At this point, one might want to object that there are many passages in which Horace adapts Greek terminology or alludes to Greek theories. Why not Aristotle, then, in *A.P.* 128? The answer must begin with a comment on the character of the line. Horace has taken two common Latin words, of extremely flexible meaning, and dropped them into his discussion as casually as he can. In the adverb *proprie* is condensed an idea which would have been far more plain and explicit as a phrase or a clause. *Communia* is a neuter plural adjective. The preceding lines offer no neuter plural substantive to which *communია* can refer. Nor is it easy to infer from them any notion which *communია* appears unequivocally to take up, else there would not exist such fundamentally dissimilar interpretations of line 128. Horace has made no effort to develop a context explaining *communია* / *proprie*, and this is what sets apart *A.P.* 128 from those passages in which he does toy with Greek terminology.¹⁴

Since Horace has done nothing to narrow the reference of his words, it seems inadvisable to press them for metaphors, or for allusions to exact ideas. Instead let us consider several other texts in which *communია*, or *communია* and *propria*, are used as Horace uses *communია* here, in the neuter plural, with no defining noun near by.

First, Quintilian 7.1.28: 'non dissimile. . . est et illud praeceptum, ut a communibus ad propria veniamus: fere enim communia generalia sunt. commune est: "tyrannum occidit", proprium: "amens tyrannum occidit", "mulier occidit, uxor occidit." ' Quintilian is not, as the language of the passage might at first suggest, reworking the doctrine of the *locus communis*. He is discussing how best to organize and present the materials of a speech, and says, as any rhetorical handbook would say today, that it is well to get down from generalities to specifics. (Compare his advice in 8.5.6 that *sententiae* can be made more vigorous by means of a 'translatio a communi ad proprium. nam cum sit rectum "nocere facile est, prodesse difficile", vehementius apud Ovidium Medea dicit: "servare potui: perdere an possim, rogas?" ')

In the prooemium to the *De medicina*, §65, Celsus criticizes that school of medicine which favoured an abstract approach to the study of disease and deprecated the close analysis of particular symptoms: 'Nam et ii, qui pecoribus ac iumentis medentur, cum propria cuiusque ex mutis animalibus nosse non possint, communibus tantummodo insistent; et exterarum gentes, cum suptilem medicinae rationem non noverint, communia tantum vident; et qui ampla valetudinaria nutriunt, quia singulis summa cura consulere non sustinent, ad communia ista confugiunt.' (The antithesis of *communია* / *propria* occurs in the following sections as well: compare especially 'a communibus tamen ad quaedam propria descendunt', prooemium 71.)

In the *De constantia sapientis*, 10.1, Seneca has finished explaining why the *sapiens* will not respond to the provocation of *iniuria*, and is now going to argue that he will not be provoked by *contumelia* either: 'quoniam priorem partem percucurrimus, ad alteram transeamus, qua quibusdam propriis, plerisque vero

¹⁴ Contrast e.g. *Sat.* 2.3.208-10, *A.P.* 99-100, and *A.P.* 234, where Horace variously introduces a welter of jargon, a

paraphrase, or a *hapax* when seasoning his verse with Greek importations.

communibus contumeliam refutabimus.' In the chapters which follow, philosophical arguments are mixed with anecdotes of *contumelia*, or the response to it, on the part of such individuals as Chrysippus, Vatinius, and Caligula. *Propria* refers to the anecdotes of particular persons, while *communia*, on which Seneca puts more emphasis, must refer to the more theoretical passages that prove the folly of giving way to anger.

In 1.5.2 of the *Libri rerum rusticarum*, Varro declares that his treatise is intended to serve the needs of a practical Roman farmer, unlike Theophrastus' *De plantis*, which is directed less to the farmer than the philosopher. However, he concedes, 'neque eo dico, quo non habeant [scripta Theophrasti] et utilia et communia quaedam.' The distinction is between theoretical and applied knowledge, another manifestation of the distinction between the general and the particular.

Finally, a remark by Cicero, *Orator* 127. It is very well, he says, for the orator to rise to universal issues. But the canny orator will ensure that, no matter how lofty the generalities he introduces, they will reflect favourably upon his client or unfavourably upon his opponent: 'ita de re communia dicentur, ut et pro reis multa leniter dicantur et in adversarios aspere.'

From these examples it is clear that *communia* could be understood with a minimum support from context as meaning 'generalities'. The passages I have quoted, though they are not highly technical in themselves, all come from didactic writers well versed in the making of philosophical distinctions. It is not surprising that in their writings especially the distinction of 'universal' and 'particular' should have begun to migrate from the realm of the technical to the semi-technical. And it is not surprising either that in his instruction to the sons of Piso, Horace should have sometimes flourished the phraseology of a scholar.¹⁵

II: CHANGE OF STYLE AND CHANGE OF SUBJECT

Although it is important to settle the meaning of *communia* / *proprie*, Horace chose these words for the sake of an effect beyond their semantic function. As used by other writers, the two words strike a note which is dry and almost pedantic. And this impression of them is certainly furthered by the diction of the line in which Horace has set them: 'difficile est proprie communia dicere.' The flatness of tone is deliberate: it serves Horace as a means of paragraphing his essay here.

Whatever one's theory of the higher scheme on which the *Ars Poetica* is hung, no one would deny that it exhibits very many junctures at which Horace passes from one point to another. He rarely proceeds in the dependable manner of Lucretius from *primum* by way of *deinde* to *postremo*. Sometimes indeed he goes out of his way to conceal the joints in his exposition by means of passages much analysed of late as 'gliding transitions'.¹⁶ More often he does demarcate

¹⁵ The pose of the lecturer is one of the unifying fictions of the *Ars*: Horace proclaims his didactic role in line 306, but it is manifested also in many other ways, as for example in the frequent imperatives (often the legislator's future imperative), and in the obtrusive use of the first-person pronoun where Horace makes known his views.

¹⁶ We owe our understanding of what Horace had essayed in his 'gliding transitions'

first of all to critics who were studying precisely the *Ars Poetica*. It would be perverse, therefore, to deny that such transitions can be found in the *A.P.* But I would suggest that they are both less frequent and less tortuous than in those poems in which Horace looked to personal experience and treated of his relationship with Maecenas, *Sat.* 1.6, 2.6, and *Epist.* 1.7.

one topic from the next, but he uses a variety of rhetorical artifices rather than particles to announce the transition.¹⁷ He may end a passage with a *sententia* or *epiphonema* (*A.P.* 390 'nescit vox missa reverti'; *Sat.* 1.1.106–7 'est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines/ quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum'; *Epist.* 1.1.52 'vilius argentum est auro, virtutibus aurum'). Or he may close with a simile or metaphor (*A.P.* 475–6 'quem vero arripuit, tenet occiditque legendo/ non missura cutem nisi plena cruoris hirudo'; *Epist.* 1.18.102 'percontabere doctos . . . quid minuatur curas, quid te tibi reddat amicum,/ quid pure tranquillet, honos an dulce lucellum/ an secretum iter et fallentis semita vitae'; *Epist.* 2.2.125 'nimis aspera sano/ levabit cultu, virtute carentia tollet:/ ludentis speciem dabit et torquebitur, ut qui/ nunc Satyrum, nunc agrestem Cyclopa movetur'). A less salient but frequent recourse is simply to change the style (or style and rhythm) where he breaks the argument. There are many means at his disposal by which to effect a modulation: alliteration, assonance, and rhyme; changes in the level of diction; variation in the length of clauses and cola; and patterned word placing. A series of examples is the best way of amplify.

Epist. 1.2.41–5:

vivendi qui recte prorogat horam,
rusticus expectat, dum defluat amnis; at ille
labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum.
quaeritur argentum puerisque beata creandis
uxor et incultae pacantur vomere silvae. . . .

To the metaphor which concludes lines 42–3 Horace has given the diction of poetry: *amnis* is a poet's word; *labitur* is used in a sense ('glide,' 'flow') peculiar to poetry (cf. *TLL* vii pars alt. 786.18–41); and *volubilis* is found more often in choice writing than in plain. A remarkable alliteration in the last line (*lab-*, *lab-*, *-lubil-*) creates the sound and sense of liquidity, and Horace has cleared the verse of any caesura which would arrest its flow.¹⁸ These ornate effects are replaced in the next section with plain words (some verging on slang) which evoke the talk and interests of the forum (*argentum*, *beata*, the legalistic *pueris creandis uxor*, *quaeritur* suggesting *quaestus*); and the abrupt enjambement of *uxor* dispels the lull induced by the river vignette.

Epist. 1.7.44–8:

parvum parva decent: mihi iam non regia Roma
sed vacuum Tibur placet aut inbelle Tarentum.
strenuus et fortis causisque Philippus agendis
clarus ab officiis octavam circiter horam
dum redit atque foro nimium distare Carinas
iam grandis natu queritur, conspexit . . .

Lines 44–5 make a poetic coda, begun with a *sententia*, and ornamented as before by alliteration (*regia Roma*, and a pair which links the ends of the half-lines, *Tibur . . . Tarentum*). Here again the closing line is divided neatly into two balanced phrases, to each of which is given a noun paired with an ornamental

¹⁷ For a different approach to the same problem, compare the interesting paper by P.H. Schrijvers, 'Comment terminer une ode?', *Mnemosyne* N.S. 4 (1973), 140–59.

¹⁸ Cf. L.P. Wilkinson, *Golden Latin*

Artistry (Cambridge, 1963), p. 70: 'Horace's rustic on the river-bank waits for the caesura, the break when he can cross, and it never comes.'

epithet. But in the new section Horace alters his diction, adopting the polite formulas of rhetorical commendation (*strenuus et fortis, clarus*). The verses themselves assume the rolling amplitude of a Ciceronian period.

Closest to A.P. 128, however, are several passages of the A.P. itself. I will quote three, in all of which, as in our text, Horace abruptly descends to flat technical language¹⁹ at the start of a new section. There are also other effects which signal the transition, but the reader will be well content to be spared further stylistic commentary.

A.P. 248–52:

offenduntur enim, quibus est equus et pater et res,
nec, siquid fricti ciceris probat et nucis emptor,
aequis accipiunt animis donantve corona.
syllaba longa brevi subiecta vocatur iambus,
pes citus . . .

A.P. 330–3:

an, haec animos aerugo et cura peculi
cum semel imbuerit, speremus carmina fingi
posse linenda cedro et levi servanda cupresso?
aut prodesse volunt aut delectare poetae . . .

A.P. 403–9:

dictae per carmina sortes
et vitae monstrata via est et gratia regum
Pieriis temptata modis ludusque repertus
et longorum operum finis: ne forte pudori
sit tibi Musa lyra sollers et cantor Apollo.
natura fieret laudabile carmen an arte,
quaesitum est . . .

A.P. 128 embodies the same technique of modulation. Having spoken of the heroes and heroines who traditionally people the plots of tragedy, Horace ends with a long, faintly disparaging sentence which describes a tragic character put together wholly out of the author's head and trundled through his play:

siquid inexpertum scaenae committis et audes
personam formare novam, servetur ad imum,
qualis ab incepto processerit, et sibi constet.

A new section follows, in which Horace speaks about the story line and advises how traditional subject matter is to be used and rearranged.²⁰ This section opens 'difficile est proprie communia dicere', a sentence which, in contrast to the one before, is short, simple, and devoid of all colour or figurative language.

III: THE FORCE OF *TU* AT A.P. 128

Finally, some remarks on *tuque*, the first word of the following clause. Critics

¹⁹ Professor Robert Renehan suggests that the tone might better be termed 'scholastic', and compares Aristotle's fondness for beginning his treatises (*Nicomachean Ethics, Politics, Metaphysics*) with accepted generalities.

²⁰ In marking a significant division at line 128 I follow the judgement of Rostagni and diverge again from Brink, who understands this and the following lines in close conjunction with what precedes.

have energetically debated whether the connective is to be understood as meaning 'and therefore you do better . . .' or 'and yet you do better . . .' In that dispute I have nothing new to say, and side with Brink against his principal antagonist, Gordon Williams. By itself, and without some clear assistance from context, I do not believe that *-que* can convey an adversative sense. My question rather concerns the pronoun: is *tu* emphatic here, and if so, what is the nature of the emphasis?

Usually the force of a nominative personal pronoun can be explained in terms of the question '*Tu (ego, nos, vos)* as opposed to whom else?' Here however it is no help to pose that question. Since the *Ars* is addressed to the two sons of Piso, Horace would have had to use the plural if he had had them specifically in mind at this point.²¹ *Tu* must be the indefinite second person, referring to any and all readers, in which case there can be no contrast between *tu* and some other party.

One solution to the question of emphasis would be to conclude that *tu* is either otiose, or somehow adds to the urgency of the verb: to deny, in other words, that it has a proper emphasis of its own. Some colour can be given to this view by adducing peculiarities of Plautine dialogue, our nearest representation of ordinary spoken Latin, in which forms of *tu* and other pronouns are constantly being juxtaposed, even where a modern ear can detect no special emphasis. The conclusion is drawn that the striving for forceful expression which is characteristic of colloquial talk eventually exhausted the force of these pronouns, so that their use became mechanical; careless employment has been noticed especially in commands and appeals.²² This interpretation might seem readily applicable to *tu* in our passage of the *Ars*. The style of the Horatian *sermo* frequently approximates to colloquial speech, and 'tuque . . . deducis in actus' is in effect a command.

Yet if the reference of the verb is really indefinite, as one seems forced to conclude, it is surprising that the pronoun should have intruded here of all places. The second person singular of the subjunctive and of the present indicative is often used instead of an indefinite pronoun—but under those circumstances it is not idiomatic Latin to add *tu*. Moreover, it does not look as though Horace can have intended to slip *tu* unobtrusively into this passage. Not only is it the first word of its clause, and disjoined by several words from its verb; it also stands isolated from the rest of its clause in the most naturally conspicuous position of the hexameter. All these features throw *tu* into relief, and invite us to seek a more satisfactory explanation of its emphasis. We need not think simply in terms of a contrast which sets off the person addressed from the speaker or from some third party. I would suggest that, if we may judge from Horace's practice, *tu* is also used when the speaker (or writer) senses that a special effort must be made to engage or recall the attention of the person to whom he is speaking. A situation of this sort may arise:

(A) when a speaker, having said something not particularly directed to anyone, first does address himself to a specific individual. In the thirteenth *Epode*, after

²¹ Later on, at line 366, Horace does address himself to just one of the brothers, and he has to specify which one he means—*o maior iuvenum*. But the elder brother cannot already be the intended addressee at line 128, since at that point there would be no way of knowing, either for the Pisones or for us, who is meant.

²² This doctrine about non-emphatic *tu* is to be found in § 102a (pp. 173–4) of J.B. Hofmann-A. Szantyr, *Lateinische Syntax und Stylistik* (Munich, 1965). A careful inspection of the passages there cited in support of these contentions would raise some doubt that the doctrine is valid.

sketching a wintry scene, Horace passes to the *carpe diem* theme and then to his immediate company:²³

... rapiamus, amici,
 occasionem de die, dumque virent genua
 et decet, obducta solvatur fronte senectus.
 tu vina Torquato move consule pressa meo.
 cetera mitte loqui . . .

Another example is found in *Sat.* 2.5. Having been told that he must either resign himself to poverty or begin courting rich freedmen of the most vulgar sort, Ulysses reflects for a moment on his course, and then once more consults Teiresias (lines 20–2):

fortem hoc animum tolerare iubebo;
 et quondam maiora tui. tu protinus, unde
 divitias aerisque ruam, dic, augur, acervos.

(B) when the speaker, having described a situation or truth in general terms, passes to the individual application for the sake of which the situation had been described. After the long priamel of *Odes* 1.7, Horace sets about dispensing counsel to a friend, and does it by means of the following progression (lines 15–19):

albus ut obscuro deterget nubila caelo
 saepe Notus neque parturit imbris
 perpetuos, sic tu sapiens finire memento
 tristitiam vitaeque labores
 molli, Plance, mero . . .

Odes 2.18.15–19 move similarly:

truditur dies die
 novaeque pergunt interire lunae:
 tu secunda marmora
 locas sub ipsum funus et sepulcri
 inmemor struis domos . . .

And finally a transition of this sort explains the use of the pronoun in Trebatius' last reply to Horace, *Sat.* 2.1.86: 'solventur risu tabulae, tu missus abibis.'

A very similar situation obtains in certain passages of command or counsel, when the speaker first discourses about the problem which prompts his advice,

²³ The abrupt movement from the vocative plural in line 3 to *tu* in line 6 has prompted some to question *amici*. But any interpretation which seeks to identify the person addressed by *tu* as one of Horace's *amici* seems improbable, since he is asked to perform the menial service of fetching down the wine. *Tu* here surely is a summons to the *puer* who is always hovering in Horace's drinking poems, and whom the genre permits to be abruptly introduced precisely because he is ever present. (A similar movement takes place in *Odes* 3.19.

For the first eight lines Horace speaks to an unnamed friend about making ready for a symposium; yet by the start of the third stanza, the party is evidently under way and Horace is hailing the serving-boy.) Whether one imagines that the *amici* of *Epodes* 13 are guests actually present around the table, or that they are ageing coevals present only in thought before Horace loses himself in the anodyne of drink, they are distinct from, and perfectly consistent with the presence of, the wine-server.

and then at last comes to the specific action recommended to his interlocutor.²⁴ *A.P.* 419–28 may illustrate:

ut praeco, ad merces turbam qui cogit emendas,
 adsentatores iubet ad lucrum ire poeta
 dives agris, dives positus in fenore nummis.
 si vero est, unctum qui recte ponere possit
 et spondere levi pro paupere et eripere artis
 litibus implicitum, mirabor, si sciet inter-
 noscere mandacem verumque beatus amicum.
 tu seu donaris seu quid donare voles cui,
 nolito ad versus tibi factos ducere plenum
 laetitiae . . .

In *Epist.* 1.18.86–8, Horace encapsulates the hazards of seeking patronage in a nautical metaphor, and then begins to dilate:

dulcis inexpertis cultura potentis amici:
 expertus metuet. tu, dum tua navis in alto est,
 hoc age, ne mutata retrorsum te ferat aura . . .

(C) in a series of injunctions, whenever the speaker has finished talking about one situation, and passes to another which entails a fresh command. *Odes* 1.9 consists of a series of imperatives addressed to Thaliarchus. At the one point at which Horace offers advice peculiarly suited to one of Thaliarchus' age and beauty, he exerts himself to recall the boy's wandering attention by using the pronoun (lines 13–16):

quid sit futurum cras, fuge quaerere, et
 quem Fors dierum cumque dabit, lucro
 adpone, nec dulcis amores
 sperne puer neque tu choreas . . .

The Calabrian host uses the pronoun when, seeing that his guest does not want to bite into one of his pears, he urges him to take some home (*Epist.* 1.7.15–16): 'vescere sodes', 'iam satis est', 'at tu, quantum vis, tolle'. Finally, *Epist.* 1.18 distils for Lollius (or professes to distil) Horace's own experience in dealing with patrons. Twice he introduces a new injunction with the pronoun *tu*, at line 37 ('arcanum neque tu scrutaberis illius umquam . . .') and at line 67 ('protinus ut moneam—siquid monitoris eges—tu/ quid de quoque viro et cui dicas, saepe videto.')

²⁴ This use of the pronoun is supported by evidence which is independent of Horace and which was compiled by a scholar in no way biased in favour of the viewpoint I am arguing. Without drawing any conclusions from the facts he observes, W. Kaempf (*De pron. personalis usu et collocatione apud poetas scaenicos Romanos* (Diss. Rostock, 1885), p. 10) writes: 'In enuntiatis imperativis vel iussivis persaepe pronomen "tu" adhibetur, maxime coniunctum cum "quin" aut "proin" particulis. Huius usus extant 243 exempla, de quibus 67 praebent pronomen sine necessitate metrica.' *Proin* is most commonly used with the imperative

in situations where a speaker completes or cuts short a prefatory explanation and finally issues his command, or where he draws together the strands of a complicated or rambling instruction and states it succinctly. This is exactly the sort of situation in which a speaker may also feel the need to seize his auditor's attention by using the pronoun: the effect of the pronoun and the effect of the particle are complementary. A second useful fact to be learned from Kaempf's data is that in a full 25 per cent of his examples, the presence of *tu* cannot be explained away as metrical convenience.

In the same way, *tu* sometimes punctuates sections of the *Ars* (e.g. at lines 153 and 385).

A.P. 128 is akin to the passages cited under (B). Upon the statement of a problem ('difficile est proprie communia dicere'), there follows a practical recommendation ('tuque rectius Iliacum carmen deducis in actus . . .'). The appearance of the pronoun here would seem decidedly to favour the opinion of those critics who believe that Horace is not continuing the discussion of lines 119–27, but turning to a different point.

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